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CHAPTER 1

What is religious authority?

Introduction

In his book, Authority, Leadership and Conflict in the Church, Paul Avis describes the root meaning of the word 'authority' as:

... profoundly liberational and therapeutic. It stems from the Latin verb augere, to make increase, to cause to grow, to fertilize, to strengthen or enlarge. This gave the noun root auctor, a doer, causer, creator, founder, beginner or leader. The senses of enabling and nurturing are fundamental – auctoritas meaning weighty counsel: more than advice and less than command (Avis, 1992:19).

On the face of it, this positive understanding of the origins of the word 'authority' bears little resemblance to our rather more negative use of the word today. In view of the current 'crisis of authority' it is perhaps time to take a closer look at this word and to explore ways in which this original sense might be recovered.

The origins of the word 'authority'

In his book, Authority, E D Watt explores the origins of the word 'authority' from its original Latin meaning through its use in the Roman world to its common usage today. The root word in Latin is auctoritas. In the Roman world auctoritas was quite distinct from potestas, which is associated with power and control and imperium, which is associated with command and order:

Auctoritas in Roman republican government was not a right to rule; it was something quite distinct from the rights, potestas and imperium, to issue lawful commands which were legally enforceable. Each civil official had the potestas or the imperium, limited in time and in scope, that went with his office. Within these specified limits, his commands were legally binding. In addition he possessed auctoritas, personal influence. To the Senate, however, neither potestas nor imperium was ascribed, only auctoritas. It issued no commands with the force of law; indeed, it issued no commands at all, but only pronouncements in the form of advice – authoritative advice – to the civil officials in whose hands executive power lay (Watt, 1982:12).

In the Christian tradition, both auctoritas and potestus have been used in relation to God, the scriptures and the Church, but as Robert Murray points out in his essay, Authority and the Spirit in the New Testament, 'the normal word for 'authority' in the New Testament is exousia:

... the noun denoting the situation in which one is able, competent or permitted. While exousia can mean moral authority, the quality by which Jesus impressed people in contrast with the scribes' cautious recital of past opinions, normally the best English equivalent for it is 'competence', the state of freedom to act, either in virtue of personal possession of a right or in virtue of authorisation by someone who has such a right and can communicate it to others. The New Testament concept expressed in the word exousia does not have the connotation of jurisdiction over others, much less the power to impose force on other persons, but rather the holder's rightful freedom to act (Murray, 1968:32-33).

In his book, Avis explains the significance of exousia in the distinction between authority and power in the practice of the Christian Church:

In the New Testament it is exousia that legitimates dynamis. Mere dynamic phenomena are not spiritually significant or theologically valid. The exousia of God and his Christ are not enforced by dynamic coercion, except in some eschatological scenarios, but are open to being freely acknowledged and willingly obeyed. The temptation for the Christian Church, as an institution, as an imperium even, has always been to take the short cut to mere power and to forget that the true substance of power, without which it is bankrupt and discredited, is the exousia, the 'moral authority' that it receives from God through the Christ whose authority did not prevent him from being nailed to a cross (Avis, 1992:20).

So, it is clear that the etymology of the word 'authority' is not straightforward. Watt concludes his account as follows:

Authority, then is a word with a range of meanings considerably broader than its Latin original ... This seems to have been the case for as long as the English word has been used. So it is clear at the outset that to consider authority is to consider a group of ideas and not a single idea: to distinguish the more important of these ideas from one another, and to show, where it can be shown, how they are related (Watt, 1982:17).

The Concise Oxford Dictionary entries support this plurality of meaning in common English usage (Thompson, 1995).

The concept of 'authority' in common usage

'Authority' is a word that has both diversity and unity in its common usage. It describes a wide range of different kinds of authority, but all of these meanings of the word have something in common. At the start of his analysis in, The Nature and Limits of Authority, Richard De George suggests a 'working model of authority which handles the more obvious cases' which can then be 'expanded, refined, revised, and corrected as needed'.

Someone or something is an authority if he (she, or it) stands in relation to someone else as superior stands to inferior with respect to some realm, field, or domain (De George, 1985:14).

De George goes on to make a first major distinction in ordinary usage between, what he calls 'executive authority', where authority 'has the right or power to act for or on someone else', and 'non-executive authority' which does not. Other writers describe the same distinction in different ways. R S Peters, for example, uses 'in-authority' and 'an-authority', which are perhaps more descriptive of how the word is actually used (Peters, 1970).

Further distinctions can be made. Non-executive authority can be further divided into 'epistemic authority', which is authority held on the basis of knowledge, and 'exemplary authority', which is authority held on the basis of example. Executive authority can be divided into 'natural authority' which arises from natural qualities such as leadership or strength, and 'conventional authority' which derives from a particular office or position. Although non-executive authority is perhaps less tangible than executive authority it plays an important role and enables complex societies to function. It is often the basis for conferring executive authority. These various distinctions can be illustrated within the different realms of authority. Political authority, for example, is primarily about the executive authority of those who hold office in government and its agencies. Religious authority can claim examples from all these distinctions. However, for those with a religious disposition, there is something unique in the authority of God.

For Max Weber, it is 'the kind of claim to legitimacy typically made' by each type of authority that distinguishes them. Legalrational authority derives from 'a belief in the legality of patterns of normative rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands'. Traditional authority derives from 'an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of the status of those exercising authority under them'. Charismatic authority derives from 'a devotion to the specific and exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative pattern or order revealed or ordained by him' (Weber, 1964:325).

If authority is to be effective then it must not only have legitimacy but also power, and it is possible to have one without the other. A de jure government in exile may have authority but no power. The de facto rulers of the country may have power but no authority. But the distinction between legitimacy and power can become more complicated. A schoolteacher having difficulties with class discipline can carry authority from the school's point of view but lack authority with the pupils. Similarly, a priest may carry the authority of the bishop but not with parishioners. In both cases, power is lacking so authority is impotent.

The distinctiveness of 'religious authority' in the Christian tradition

In his book, Authority: A Philosophical Analysis, R Baine Harris writes:

Of the four main historical types of authority: civil, moral, scientific, and religious, the last one has received the greatest challenge in modern times. Numerous historical and social factors are involved in this challenge, not least of which is the widespread difference of opinion concerning the meaning of religious authority itself (Baine Harris, 1976:132).

For those within the Christian tradition, God is the ultimate source of all authority. As traditionally understood, God created the universe and established the laws of nature. He also created human beings as part of that creation and continues to exercise authority over them.

By recognizing or acknowledging God's dominion over them, human beings make God a de facto executive authority ... However, divine authority is not religious authority. Divine authority is exercised by God; whatever religious authority turns out to be, it is exercised by human beings (De George, 1985:218).

What we can call 'religious authority' arises in both individuals and in groups and arises in different ways. Christianity involves communities of believers, who are bound together by their common beliefs, joint practices, and some organisational structure. Within those groups there will be bishops, priests and deacons who have executive authority by virtue of their office. There will be others who have non-executive authority by virtue of their knowledge or example. It may well be that the nonexecutive and less tangible aspects of authority which individuals and groups have will ultimately be the most significant for the flourishing of the faith at any particular time or in any particular place. But how is that authority legitimised?

Religious authority comes from God, is exercised by human beings in the context of a church or religion, and is limited to religious matters – usually questions of belief in God, man's relation to God, the actions derived from these beliefs, and the morality implied by or contained in them. Just as belief in God is central to religion, so the basis and justification for religious authority is found in religious faith or in belief in God and his revelation (De George, 1985:219).

The major source for the notion of religious authority in the Christian tradition is the Bible. In the Old Testament, all forms of authority rested in religious authority and therefore ultimately in God. In later periods, the different forms of authority become distinctive and established on their own terms, but the tensions between the various forms were resolved in some places and at some times better than others. The history of the relationship between these forms in Western Europe is similar but, according to Baine Harris, 'the exact function of religious authority was never settled in the Christian West'. He identifies three different issues that have led to the confusion concerning the meaning of the concept of 'religious authority.

The first is the battle to separate civil, moral, and scientific authority from any dependency upon a religious base. The second is the conflict between the Church and the State for the control of society. The third is the debate that has gone on ... concerning the criteria that should be used in the authenticating of religious meaning (Baine Harris, 1976:134).

The most important distinction, however, that can be made between the various ways in which religious authority is understood is that between 'ultimate religious authority', that is God, and the 'representative religious authority' of individuals. Since religious authority can be vested not only in individuals but also in groups, and not only in people but in texts and traditions, the definition of religious authority must be wider. It can also be extended to include, not only 'extrinsic authority', that is, authority arising from outside, but also 'intrinsic authority', that is, the authority that arises for an individual from within himself. It follows from this that the representative religious authority's most important quality is the extent to which he (she, or it) is 'transparent to the deity'.

Historically, there have been four finals appeals in the verification of religious authority – reason, experience, scripture and tradition – and a battle has raged and continues to rage about each of them. With this in mind, it is possible to trace the various ways in which people, texts and traditions have been considered to be 'transparent to the deity', and it is a complicated story. It starts with the distinction between 'revelation' and 'reason'.

The traditional distinction between 'revelation' and 'reason'

Christians have understood two sharply contrasting ways in which men and women learn about God. Revelation has traditionally been understood in terms of this distinction between revealed and rational knowledge.

Based on their interpretation of John's Gospel, both Augustine and Aquinas understood revelation as 'divine illumination'. In his essay entitled Revelation, George Stroup describes how, in his commentary on John's Gospel, Augustine:

... sounded a theme that is to be found throughout his theological writing: the identification of Jesus Christ as the light which illumines the darkness of the human intellect and overcomes the blindness created by human sin (Stroup, 1983:92).

In Augustine's writing, the distinction between the roles of revelation and reason is unclear. In Aquinas, however, a synthesis is achieved in which the two are understood as 'distinct but complimentary realms of understanding'. In his book The Idea of Revelation in Recent Thought, John Baillie writes:

Aquinas would tell you on the one hand of 'an ascent, by the natural light of reason, through created things to the knowledge of God', and on the other of 'a descent, by the mode of revelation, of divine truth which exceeds the human intellect, not as demonstrated to our sight but as a communication delivered for our belief, (Baillie, 1956:4).

This synthesis did not last, and by the time of the Reformation, revelation and reason were firmly separated. This happened because views about the importance of one or the other became polarised. The Rationalists placed greater emphasis on reason, with some denying that any knowledge of God was possible without unaided powers of reason. The Reformers argued that human reason was so corrupted by sin that only revelation through scripture could yield reliable knowledge of God. For Luther, the Word of God is Jesus Christ and we only have access to that Word through the words of proclamation and scripture. But Luther does not simply identify the Word of God with the external words of proclamation and scripture. These words only become God's Word when the Spirit 'enables the external words to become internal words'. The Word and Spirit can therefore not be separated. The Roman Catholics took a different view. They argued that revelation took place through both the words of scripture and the traditions of the church.

Stroup describes how in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries both models of revelation – Divine Illumination and Word and Spirit – were given objectivist interpretations by both Reformers and Catholics:

In both cases, revelation referred to a series of propositions which were understood to be objectively true because they were taught by a divinely inspired church or could be found in a book authored by God (Stroup, 1983:96).

As Stroup also points out, it was inevitable that as the intellectual climate changed these positions would be challenged. In the event, both classical modes of revelation were 'shaken at their foundations' by the Enlightenment.

The period from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century was not only a period during which particular developments took place, but it was also a period during which a paradigmatic shift in intellectual thought occurred. The rise of science and the distrust of tradition were just two examples of a movement in which every proposition became subject to rational examination.

The Enlightenment insisted on 'reason' as the primary capacity of human beings and as the ultimate authority and judge for all religious claims. As a result, some thinkers tended towards atheism because of this new emphasis on the rational side of human nature. Others tended towards Deism in an attempt to accommodate the new approach by belief in a god who could be known by reason rather than revelation. Yet others rejected the claims of reason altogether and argued more strongly in favour of a faith based on revelation. Those who remained in the mainstream began to question previously accepted approaches to both scripture and tradition. They came to understand the importance of historicity, and from the Renaissance onwards, scholars applied historical-critical methods both to biblical and doctrinal issues. It became clear that individuals, communities and institutions were conditioned by their social and cultural contexts and what made sense at one time and in one place might not necessarily apply in another. Authority came to be associated more with the autonomy of individual responses to knowledge of God than with obedience to an imposed command.

(Continues…)

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Excerpted from "The Authority of Service and Love"
by .
Copyright © 2016 Roger Payne.
Excerpted by permission of John Hunt Publishing Ltd..
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